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PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON INVARIANTS OF
DIAGONALIZABLE GROUPS
FRANTISˇEK MARKO, ALEXANDR N. ZUBKOV, AND MARTIN JURA´Sˇ
Abstract. We develop a public key cryptosystem based on invariants of di-
agonalizable groups and investigate properties of such cryptosystem first over
finite fields, then over number fields and finally over finite rings. We consider
the security of these cryptosystem and show that it is necessary to restrict the
set of parameters of the system to prevent various attacks (including linear
algebra attacks and attacks based on Euclidean algorithm).
Introduction
A new idea for a public-key cryptosystem based on the invariant theory was
proposed by Grigoriev in [10]. His original idea was later developed in the paper
[11]. The last paragraph of the paper [10] reads as follows:
”The current state of the art in cryptography does not allow one to prove the
security of cryptosystems; this is usually a question of belief in the difficulty of a
revelant problem and a matter of experience (that is why it is not quite unusual to
have a paper on cryptography without theorems, for example, this paper). Quite the
opposite, one can expect a ”disappointing” breaking of a particular cryptosystem.
This can happen for any of the afforementioned examples (without solving the graph
isomorphism problem, see the discussion above). On the other hand, such breaking
could lead to interesting algorithms in the theory of group representations. Thus
one can treat the above examples (and the general construction as a whole) just as
a suggestion to play with cryptosystems based on the invariant theory.”
The purpose of our paper is to develop and design a public-key cryptosystem
based on invariants of diagonalizable groups. We go beyond the philosophy of
the preceeding quote and design a concrete public-key cryptosystem, present an
algorithm for its implementation and show how to break systems based on invariants
of some groups.
At first we consider these cryptosystems over finite fields F , then we investigate
cryptosystems over fields of characteristic zero (in particular, over number fields),
and finally we work with cryptosystems over finite rings (in particular, residue
classes of number fields modulo an integer). Each part is distinguished by distinctive
properties. For example, cyclicity of the multiplicative group F× plays the most
important role over finite fields, the theory of divisors and factorization properties
are most important for the number fields, and both properties are important when
we work over finite rings. One property that remains valid in all cases is that
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if G not cyclic then it produces more complicated (and secure) cryptosystems as
compared to the case when C is cyclic.
Finding an invariant of the group G is trivial in the finite field case, and what
is challenging is to find one separating vectors from the given set S. We show a
simple example when n = 2 for which the security of the cryptosystem is equivalent
to the discrete logarithm assumption. Over number fields, the main problem is to
find an invariant of G and the problem of the separation of elements of S can be
neglected. The cryptosystems over finite rings combine features of the previous two
cases and further investigation of their properties will be necessary.
Finally, our work on this cryptosystem leads to an investigation of interesting
mathematical problems related to the security of the invariant-based cryptosystem.
Theoretical results about related mathematical concepts like minimal degrees of
invariants and invariants of supergroups will appear in a separate paper [15].
1. Invariants of finitely-generated linear groups
In this paper, we will consider only finitely generated groups G acting faithfully
on a finite-dimensional vector space V = Fn over a field F of arbitrary character-
istic. Therefore we can asume that G ⊂ GL(V ). From the very beginning, assume
that the representation ρ : G → GL(V ) is fixed, and the group G is given by a
finite set of generators. With respect to the standard basis of V , each element g
of G is therefore represented by an invertible matrix of size n × n, and g acts on
vectors in V by matrix multiplication.
Let F [V ] = F [x1, . . . , xn] be the algebra of polynomial functions on GL(V ).
Then G acts on F [V ] via gf(v) = f(g−1v), where g ∈ G, f ∈ F [V ] and v ∈ V . An
invariant f of G is a polynomial f ∈ F [V ] which has a property that its values are
the same on orbits of the group G. In other words, for every vector v ∈ V and for
every element g ∈ G, we have f(gv) = f(v). We note that different representations
of G lead to different invariants in general but this is not going to be a problem for
us since our representation of G is fixed. We will denote the algebra of invariants
of G by F [V ]G.
2. Public key-cryptosystem based on invariants
We start by recalling the original idea of the public-key cryptosystem based on
invariants from the paper [10] and recalling its modification presented in [11].
2.1. Design of cryptosystems based on invariants of groups. To design a
cryptosystem, Alice needs to choose a finitely generated subgroup G of GL(V ) for
some vector space V = Fn and a set {g1, . . . , gs} of generators of G. Alice also
chooses an n×n matrix a. Alice needs to know an invariant f of this representation
of G. Depending on this invariant f , Alice chooses a set M = {v0, . . . , vr−1} of
vectors from V such that the set S = aM = {av0, . . . , avr−1} is separated by
the invariant f . This means that f(avi) 6= f(avj) whenever i 6= j. The set M
represents messages Alice can receive and elements of the set S are bijectively
assigned to elements of M . The sets S is a part of the public key.
Alice also chooses a set of randomly generated elements g1, . . . , gm of G (say, by
multiplying some of the given generators of G), which generates a subgroup of G
that will be denoted by Gs.
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Alice announces as a public key the set S representing possible messages, and the
group H = a−1Gsa, conjugated to Gs, by announcing its generators hi = a
−1gia
for i = 1, . . . ,m.
In the first paper [10] its author assumes that the group G, its representation
in GL(V ) and the invariant f are in the public key. We refer to this setup as
variant one. However, the version in paper [11] assumes that G, its representation
in GL(V ) and the invariant f are secret. We refer to this setup as variant two. We
will comment on both variants later.
For the encryption, every time Bob wants to transmit a message m ∈ M , he
looks up the correponding element of vi ∈ S and chooses a randomly generated
element h of the group H(by multiplying some of the generators of H given as a
public key). Then he computes u = hvi and transmits the vector u ∈ V to Alice.
To decript the message, Alice first computes au and then applies the invariant
f . If u = hvi, then f(au) = f(ahvi) = f(aa
−1gavi) = f(gavi) = f(avi). Since
a was chosen so that f(avi) 6= f(avj) whenever i 6= j, Alice can determine from
the value of f(au) whether the symbol vi and the corresponding message that was
encrypted by Bob.
Let us discuss briefly the choices of n, F , G and S.
It appears that choosing large n would be better for the security of the cryp-
tosystem but it would increase the expansion in size from plaintext to ciphertext.
The bigger and more complicated the structure of F , the better for the security of
the cryptosystem. Analogously, the more complicated structure of G, in particular
G not cyclic would be preferred.
Finally, we should choose the set S as large as possible for two reasons. The
first reason is that larger set S shrink the number of invariants of C that separate
elements of S and thus increases the security of the cryptosystem. The second
reason is that larger set S decreases the ratio of the expansion in size from plaintext
to ciphertext for the encryption using this cryptosystem.
2.2. Previously described attacks on the cryptosystem based on invari-
ants of groups. Let us note that it is important that during the encryption process
by Bob he uses all generators hi for scrambling the message. If some generators
are not involved, then to decode his message Charlie would succeed if he finds an
invariant of a subgroup of H , which is an easier task.
The attacks described below are mentioned in [10] and [11]. We are providing
their description for the convenience of the reader and for further clarification. Also,
these attacks we previously described only for the case when |M | = 2 and we adapt
them to the case when |M | = r.
To break the encryption, it is enough for Charlie to find any invariant f ′ of the
group H that separates elements of S. If r > 2 then we can replace this by a weaker
condition. Namely, it is enough to find f ′ such that f ′(u) = f ′(vi) for a unique
vi ∈ S.
Indeed if Charlie computes f ′(u) = f ′(hvi) = f
′(vi) and then compares f
′(u)
with f ′(vi). If there is a unique vector vi such that f
′(u) = f(vi), then the message
corresponding to vi was sent by Bob.
2.2.1. Variant one. Consider variant one of the cryptosystem - that is, the group
G, its representation in GL(V ) and an invariant f are known. We can assume
that f is a homogeneous polynomial of degree d. In this case, it is known that
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there is a homogeneous invariant f ′ of H of degree d that is of the form f ′(v) =
f(bv) for some matrix b ∈ GL(V ). Then f ′ is an invariant of H if and only if
f(bhiv) = f
′(hiv) = f
′(v) = f(bv) for each generator hi, where i = 1, . . . ,m of H .
Comparing coefficients at
(
n+d−1
d
)
monomials we obtain m
(
n+d−1
d
)
linear equations
in n2 variables (entries of b). Any solution of this system produces an invariant of
H .
Another possible way to attack the system is to find a matrix b ∈ GL(V ) such
that bHb−1 ⊂ G. This technique is related to the conjugacy problem for matrix
groups and the graph isomorphism problem.
2.2.2. Variant two. In variant two of the cryptosystem, the group G, its represen-
tation in GL(V ) and the invariant f are secret. However, Charlie can attempt
to find an invariant f ′ directly by choosing a possible degree d and solving linear
systems derived from the equations f ′(hiv) = f
′(v) for each generator hi, where
i = 1. . . . ,m. This produces a linear system consisting of m
(
n+d−1
d
)
equations in
the
(
n+d−1
d
)
unknowns that are the coefficients at monomials in f ′.
Another approach is to find a matrix h ∈ H such that hu = vi for some i
(attempting to recover the encryption done by Bob). This problem is related to
the vector transporter problem and the graph isomorphism problem - see [10]. Let
us note that it was announced reently in [2] that the graph isomorphism problem
can be solved in quasipolynomial time.
3. Cryptosystems over finite fields F
In this section we will discuss cryptosystems based in invariants of groups over
finite fields F . We will present concrete examples and show how the security of
those cryptosystems is guaranteed if we assume computational hardness of the
dicrete logarithm problem.
3.1. n = 1. For simplicity, in the case n = 1, we will assume that the cardinality
of the set S is 2.
The case n = 1 is singular and it implies G ⊂ F . If there is a nonconstant
invariant f = p(x) of G that attains the constant value c when evaluated on each
element of G, then G is a subset of the set of roots of the polynomial p(x)− c. In
particular, G is finite.
Let F be a finite field GF (q) of characteristic p > 0 and cardinality q = pb.
The set of non-zero elements F× of F with respect to the multiplication in F form
a cyclic group generated by a primitive element a. Also, F is isomorphic to the
splitting field of the polynomial xq−x = 0 over the prime field GF (p). In particular,
xq − x is an invariant of F and xq−1 is an invariant of F× attaining the value 1.
Since F× is cyclic, every subgroup Gd of F
× is also cyclic, generated by a
q−1
d ,
given as a set of roots of xd− 1 = 0 for some d|(q− 1). The set of invariants of G is
generated by xd. If d 6= q− 1, we can choose v0 and v1 from F× such that vd0 6= vd1 .
In particular, any choice v0 ∈ Gd and v1 /∈ Gd will do. Then the invariant f = xd
of G separates v0 and v1.
For setting up the corresponding cryptosystem over a finite field F we need to
select an element g ∈ F (that generates G) and find an exponent d′ < q − 1 such
that gd
′
= 1. Then we can select for v0 any element of G (that is a power of g).
We also need to find an element v1 ∈ F that does not belong to G. Since we do
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not know the order d of g, the simplest way to guarantee this condition is to make
sure that vd
′
1 6= 1. Then xd
′
is an invariant of G separating v0 and v1.
To break such a system, we need, for a given group G and vectors v0 and v1,
to find an invariant of G separating v0 and v1. An invariant of G, namely the
polynomial xq−1 is known from the beginning but the problem is to find one that
separates v0 and v1.
If there is a algorithm that determines the order any element g ∈ F in polynomial
time, then the cryptosystem can be setup and broken in polynomial time, hence
it is not secure. Even if there is no algorithm that determines the order of g in
polynomial time, it might be possible to find a separating invariant and break the
cryptosystem randomly.
Consider the following example.
Example 3.1. Let s be a prime dividing q−1, d = q−1
s
, G = Gd is generated by g,
v0 = g and v1 = a (a is a primitive element of F
×). Then the only invariant of G
that separates v0 and v1 is x
d. Therefore breaking of this cryptosystem is equivalent
to finding of the order of g, and is also equivalent to finding of the prime factor
s of q − 1. Therefore we conclude that breaking of all cryptosystems of this type
is equivalent to finding of all prime divisors of q − 1 (hence finding of the prime
factorization of q − 1.)
We give a brief review of the computational complexity of factorization of integers
in the next subsection.
The value of the above example is in showing that even if an invariant of G is
known, it might not be completely trivial to find an invariant of G separating v0
and v1.
Of course we can find the order of g and break this crytosystem using the discrete
logarithm (although it might be easier just to find the prime factorization of q− 1).
Since the multiplicative group of F has a primitive element a, and the multiplicative
group of G has generator g, we can use the discrete logarithm to find out the
exponent h such that g = ah. Then g is the primitive d = q−1
GCD(h,q−1) -th root of
unity. Once we know the order d of g, we have found the invariant xd, separating
v0 and v1.
Nevertheless, we will not use the case n = 1 to setup a cryptosystem due to con-
cerns about its security. The reason is that in the original setup of the system some
partial information about the order d of g is required. Only a partial information
about the order d is required to break such a cryptosystem and we are not aware
of an effective setup when it is easy to create such a cryptosystem and difficult to
break it.
3.2. Computational complexity of the factorization of integers. We refer
to [28] for the description of various algorithms and their complexity.
First we will overview the determininistic algorithms for factorization of integers.
One of the simplest is the Fermat algorithm that works fast n = pq is a product
of two primes that are of the same magnitude. The most popular detemininistic
algorithms for factorization of integers (all of them of exponential complexity) are
(p−1)-method, Pollard’s ρ-method and the Pollard-Strassen algorithm. These algo-
rithms are often used to find small prime factors. For more details and description
of other algorithms, see Chapter 2 of [28].
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When working over finite field F = GF (q), where q = pk for a prime p, the
following theorem helps to determine the factorization of q − 1.
Theorem 3.2. (Theorem 2.21 of [28]) Let b, k ∈ N, b > 1, and n = bk − 1. If p is
a prime number dividing n, then one of the following two assertions holds:
1. p|bd − 1 for some d < k, d|k;
2. p ≡ 1 (mod k).
If p > 2 and k is odd, then, in the second case p ≡ 1 (mod 2k).
Although this statement seems easy to use, in reality it gives an algorithm of
exponential complexity.
Probabilistic algorithms for factorization of integers with subexponential com-
plexity are discussed in details in Chapter 3 of [28]. The complexity of these al-
gorithms is of the form Ln[γ, c], where γ =
1
2 or
1
3 and c is a positive constant,
where
Lx[γ, c] = e
(c+o(1))(log x)γ(log log x)1−γ
and o(1)→ 0 as n→∞.
Most popular algorithms of this nature are Lenstra eliptic curve method, qua-
dratic sieve and number field sieve. For more details see Chapters 3 and 4 of [28].
3.3. n = 2 and G cyclic. Next, we will discuss the case when G is cyclic and
n = 2 and show that breaking of the corresponding cryptosystem is equivalent to
solving of a discrete logarithm problem.
Assume that F = FG(q) is a finite field of cardinality q, where q = pr and a be
a primitive element of F×.
Let a cyclic group G be generated by the element γ =
(
γ1 0
0 γ2
)
, where γ1 = a
l1
and γ2 = a
l2 and the set S consists of vectors ~vi =
(
ai1
ai2
)
for i = 1, . . . , s.
Since every invariant of G is a sum of monomial invariants, to obtain a complete
description of all invariants of G we only need to find monomial invariants. A
monomial f = xd11 x
d2
2 is an invariant of G if γ
d1x
1 γ
d2x
2 is constant for every integer
x. Plugging in x = q − 1 we get γd11 γd22 = 1 which is equivalent to
d1l1 + d2l2 ≡ 0 (mod q − 1).
A monomial invariant f = xd11 x
d2
2 separates vectors ~vi and ~vj if and only if
ad1i1 a
d2
i2 6= ad1j1ad2j2 .
The following is an example of a groupG for which finding an invariant f separat-
ing vectors from the given set S is computationally hard problem - see Proposition
3.4.
Example 3.3. Assume that F = FG(q) is a finite field of cardinality q, where
q = pr and s is a (large) prime that divides q − 1. Let α ∈ F× be an element of
order s, and let β = αb for a secret integer b not divisible by s.
Let V = F 2, G ⊂ GL(V ) be a cyclic group generated by the element g =(
α 0
0 β
)
, and the set S consists of vectors vi =
(
1
ai
)
, where ai = α
i for i =
0, . . . , s− 1. Consider the cryptosystem based on this group G and the set S.
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A general element of G, written as gx for some exponent x, acts on vectors vi as
gxvi =
(
αx
βxai
)
=
(
w1
w2
)
= ~w, for i = 0, . . . , s− 1.
3.3.1. Discrete logarithm approach. If the exponent b is known, then we can decode
ai and vi from ~w simply using ai =
w2
wb1
.
Otherwise, we can break this cryptosystem if we have an effective algorithm for
the discrete logarithm problem in F×. Indeed, to determine i it is enough to solve
for y such that (β
α
)y = w2
w1ai
.
3.3.2. Invariant approach.
Proposition 3.4. Finding a monomial invariant f of G from Example 3.3 sepa-
rating elements of S is equivalent to finding b (mod s), hence to finding a solution
of the discrete logarithm problem for the pair α and β.
Proof. We have chosen vectors vi in such way that none of the invariants of G of the
form xe1 or x
e
2 would separate any two of them. Since there is a monomial invariant
of G separating all elements of the set S (for example xb1x
q
2), we can assume that
it is of the form f = xd11 x
d2
2 , where d1, d2 6= 0. Then
d1 + bd2 ≡ 0 (mod s) and ad2i 6= ad2j whenever i 6= j.
This implies f(~w) = wd11 w
d2
2 = (α
x)d1(βxai)
d2 = (αx)d1+ad2ad2i = a
d2
i and that
determines vi.
Therefore finding a monomial invariant f separating elements of S requires find-
ing a solution of the congruence d1+ bd2 ≡ 0 (mod s) which is equivalent to deter-
mining b (mod s) and this is equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem for the
pair α and β.
Conversely, if we are able to determine b (mod s), then fr = x
b
1x
−1
2 is a rational
invariant of G and xb1x
q
2 is a monomial invariant of G separating all elements of
S. 
Let us describe an algorithm how to describe all invariants of cyclic group G
when n = 2 and find one separating elements of S. Finding a monomial invariant
xd11 x
d2
2 of G is equivalent to solving the congruence d1l1+d2l2 ≡ 0 (mod q− 1). To
find such an invariant, we first need to find the primitive element a and use discrete
logarithms to solve for l1 and l2 from γ1 = a
l1 and γ2 = a
l2 .
Once l1 and l2 are known, there is an effective way to describe all solutions of the
above congruence and all monomial invariants ofG as follows. If GCD(l1, q−1) = 1,
then we can choose any d2 and compute d1 = −l−11 d2l2 (mod q − 1). Here we find
l−11 (mod q − 1) using the Euclidean algorithm which runs in polynomial time. If
GCD(l1, q−1) = d > 1, then d|d2l2, We replace l1 by l1d , l2 by l′2 = l2GCD(l2,d) , d2 by
d′2 = d2
GCD(l2,d)
d
and the congruence d1l1+d2l2 ≡ 0 (mod q−1) by d1l′1+d′2l′2 ≡ 0
(mod q−1
d
). The solutions of the last congruence are described analogously as above
since GCD(l′1,
q−1
d
) = 1. Finally, we compute d2 = d
′
2
d
GCD(l2,d)
. Since we know all
invariants, it remains to select one separating elements of S.
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3.3.3. Complexity and expansion in size. Coming back to the Proposition 3.4, we
have seen that even in the simplest case when n = 2 and the group G is cyclic the
task of finding invariants of G separating elements of S is of the same complexity
as the discrete logarithm problem.
Since the discrete logarithm assumption is weaker than the computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption and that is weaker than decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption
which are used in Diffie-Hellman key exchange and ElGamal encryption, we have
a guarantee that the invariant-based cryptosystem of Example 3.3 is at least as
secure as many standard and widely used public-key cryptosystems.
If we compare the cryptosystem from Example 3.3 to ElGamal public-key cryp-
tosystem, we note that while ElGamal encryption produces a 2:1 expansion in size
from plaintext (by this we mean a sequence of 0’s and 1’s) to ciphertext, and the
invariant-based cryptosystem from the above example produces 2 log2 q : log2 s ex-
pansion in size from plaintext to ciphertext. If s is not small in comparison to
q, say log2 slog2 q
is close to 1, then this expansion will be close to 2:1. Also, higher
the number s becomes, the ratio of expansion from the plaintext to the ciphertext
would improve.
In general, if s is small or if it is comparable to q, then finding the prime s
would be easy. If q − 1 = s1s2s3, where s = s1 6= s2 are two large primes and s3 is
small integer, then it could be challenging to determine the order s of the element
α since one needs to determine the prime factorization of q − 1. In this cases the
best choice would be if log2 slog2 q
is close to 12 . This implies that the corresponding
expansion from plaintext to ciphertext will be close to 4:1 (Perhaps not a big price
to pay for increasing the security of the cryptosystem).
In the case of general n and a set S of cardinality r we get n log2 |F | : log2 r
expansion. A trivial upper bound on the cardinality r of the set S is given by the
index [Fn : G]. Adjusting the previous example for n = 2 we are able to get the
expansion ratio close to n : 1 - and quite possibly even better ratio with different
choices of S. While such ratio is a disadvantage, if we choose n small, this should
not play a big role for the effectiveness of the cryptosystem.
3.4. Computational complexity of the discrete logarithm problem. Algo-
rithms for computing discrete logarithm are subject of Chapter 5 of [28]. There are
deterministic algorithms of exponential complexity and probabilistic algorithms of
subexponential complexity. There is an algorithms for discrete logarithm problems
in prime fields of complexity Lp[
1
2 ; c]. ElGamal [9] gave an algorithm that works
over Galois fields GF (q) and has the complexity Lq[
1
2 ; c]. It is interesting that it
uses a representation of GF (q) as the residue class ring Z/P, where Z is the ring
of algebraic integers of the cyclotomic field Q(ζp), and P is a prime ideal of Z of
norm q.
Another algorithm working in prime fields based on number field sieve has com-
plexity Lp[
1
3 ; c]. Finally, in section 5.6 of [28] there is an interesting algorithm for
discrete logarithm with composite modulus based on Fermat quotients that works
in residue class rings Z/mZ with composite m.
3.5. G cyclic. When n > 2, the problem of finding monomial invariants of a cyclic
group G over a finite field F is essentially reduced to multiple applications of the
method already used to find invariants of cyclic G in the case n = 2.
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Assume that F = FG(q) is a finite field of cardinality q, where q = pr and a be
a primitive element of F×.
Let a cyclic group G be generated by the element g =


γ1 0 . . . 0
0 γ2 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . γn

,
where γj = a
lj and 0 ≤ lj < q − 1 for j = 1, . . . , n and the set S consists of vectors
~vi =


ai1
ai2
. . .
ain

 for i = 1, . . . , s.
Since every invariant of G is a sum of monomial invariants, to obtain a complete
description of all invariants of G we only need to find monomial invariants. A
monomial f = xd11 x
d2
2 . . . x
dn
n is an invariant of G if γ
d1x
1 γ
d2x
2 . . . γ
dnx
n is constant for
every integer x. Plugging in x = q− 1 we get γd11 γd22 . . . γdnn = 1 which is equivalent
to
d1l1 + d2l2 + . . .+ dnln ≡ 0 (mod q − 1).
In particular, x
lj
i x
−li
j for i 6= j are rational invariants of G and xlji xq−1−lij are
monomial invariants of G.
A monomial invariant f = xd11 x
d2
2 . . . x
dn
n separates vectors ~vi and ~vj if and only
if
ad1i1 a
d2
i2 . . . a
dn
in 6= ad1j1ad2j2 . . . adnjn .
Proposition 3.5. Let G be a cyclic group, ~vk 6= ~vl be elements of Fn and n ≥ 2. If
there is a monomial invariant f of G separating vk and vl, then there is a monomial
invariant of G the form xeii x
ej
j that also separates ~vk and ~vl.
Proof. We will proceed by induction on n. The statement is trivial for n = 2.
Assume that the statement is true for all k < n. If we write f = xd11 . . . x
dn
n , then
f invariant separating ~vk and ~vl implies
d1l1 + . . .+ dnln ≡ 0 (mod q − 1) and ad1k1 . . . adnkn 6= ad1l1 . . . adnln .
Denote d = GCD(l1, . . . , ln, q−1). Then there is an index t such that (ad1k1 . . . adnkn)
lt
d 6=
(ad1l1 . . . a
dn
ln )
lt
d . If the invariant x
−
lt
d
u x
lu
d
t does not separate ~vk and ~vl, then a
−
lt
d
ku a
lu
d
kt =
a
−
lt
d
lu a
lu
d
lt which gives a
−du
lt
d
ku a
du
lu
d
kt = a
−du
lt
d
lu a
du
lu
d
lt . This together with a
d1
lt
d
k1 . . . a
dn
lt
d
kn 6=
a
d1
lt
d
l1 . . . a
dn
lt
d
ln implies
a
d1
lt
d
k1 . . . a
0
ku . . . a
dt
lt
d
+du
lu
d
kt . . . a
dn
lt
d
kn 6= a
d1
lt
d
l1 . . . a
0
lu . . . a
dt
lt
d
+du
lu
d
lt . . . a
dn
lt
d
ln .
Replace the space Fn by Fn−1, the group G with a group G′ generated by the
matrix g′ obtained from the matrix g generating G by deleting its u-th row and
column, and replace vectors ~vi with ~v
′
i obtained by deleting the entry in their u-th
row. By the above, the monomial f ′ = x
d1
lt
d
1 . . . x̂
0
u . . . x
dt
lt
d
+du
lu
d
t . . . x
dn
lt
d
n separates
~v′k and ~v
′
l. Additionally, f
′ is an invariant of G′ because
d1
lt
d
l1 + . . .+ 0̂lu + . . .+ (dt
lt
d
+ du
lu
d
)lt + . . .+ dn
lt
d
ln =
lt
d
[
d1l1 + . . .+ 0̂ + . . .+ (dtlt + dulu) + . . .+ dnln
]
≡ 0 (mod q − 1).
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Using the inductive assumption we get an invariant of G′ of the form xeii x
ej
j
that separates ~v′k and ~v
′
l. It is clear that this is also an invariant of G and that it
separates ~vk and ~vl. 
As a consequence of the above proposition we conclude that in order to find an
invariant monomial of G separating vectors ~vk and ~vl of S we can proceed by going
through all the pairs of indices i and j from 1 through n and and solve analogous
problem when G is replaces by Gij generated by 2× 2 matrix gij =
(
γi 0
0 γj
)
and
vectors ~vk and ~vl are replaced by vector
(
aki
akj
)
and
(
ali
alj
)
, respectively.
3.6. G not cyclic. Noncyclic groups G exist for every n ≥ 2. We start with an
example generalizing Example 3.3.
Example 3.6. Let F = FG(q), where q = pr, and s1 and s2 be (large) primes
dividing q − 1. Let α1 ∈ F× be an element of order s1 and α2 ∈ F× be an element
of order s2, and ai be distinct elements of F
× such that their order divides s1s2. Let
G be given by two generators g1 =
(
α1 0
0 β1
)
and g2 =
(
α2 0
0 β2
)
, where β1 = α
b1
1
and β2 = α
b2
2 for secret integers b1 not divisible by s1, and b2 not divisible by s2 Let
the set S consist of vectors ~vi =
(
1
ai
)
. Consider the cryptosystem based on this
group G and set S.
The general element g of G, written as gx11 g
x2
2 , acts on ~vi as g~vi =
(
αx11 α
x2
2
βx11 β
x2
2 ai
)
=(
w1
w2
)
= ~w.
As before, we have chosen vectors ~vi in such way that none of the invariants of G
of the form xe1 or x
e
2 would separate them. If there is an invariant of G separating
vectors ~vi, then we can assume that it is of the form f = x
d1
1 x
d2
2 .
If f = xd11 x
d2
2 is an invariant of G, then (α
x1
1 α
x2
2 )
d1(βx11 β
x2
2 )
d2 = 1. If a is the
primitive element of F×, α1 = a
a1 and α2 = a
a2 for secret integers a1 and a2, then
this is equivalent to
(a1x1 + a2x2)d1 + (a1b1x1 + a2b2x2)d2 ≡ 0 (mod q − 1)
for every x1 and x2. This condition is equivalent to the system of congruences
a1(d1 + b1d2) ≡ 0 (mod q − 1) and a2(d1 + b2d2) ≡ 0 (mod q − 1).
These two congruences are related to different generators g1 and g2 of G. We have
seen earlier that using discrete logarithms we can describe all monomial invariants
of the cyclic subgroups 〈g1〉 and 〈g2〉 of G. Of course, the invariants of G are exactly
those polynomials that are invariants with respect to 〈g1〉 and 〈g2〉 simultaneously.
The last two congruences can be solved by using integer linear programming
because they are equivalent to the linear system
a1d1+ a1b1d2 + (q − 1)d3 = 0
a2d1+ a2b2d2 + (q − 1)d4 = 0
in integers d1, d2, d3 and d4.
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Now consider the general case whenG has generators gi =


γi1 0 . . . 0
0 γi2 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . γin


for i = 1, . . . t, where γij = a
lij and 0 ≤ lij < q − 1 for j = 1, . . . , n and the set S
consists of vectors ~vi =


ai1
ai2
. . .
ain

 for i = 1, . . . , s. The general element of G is written
as g = gy11 . . . g
yt
t for some integers y1, . . . , yt.
Since every invariant of G is a sum of monomial invariants, to obtain a complete
description of all invariants of G we only need to find monomial invariants. A
monomial f = xd11 x
d2
2 . . . x
dn
n is an invariant of G if
∏t
i=1 γ
yid1
i1 γ
yid2
i2 . . . γ
yidn
in = 1 for
all integers y1, . . . , yt. This implies γ
d1
i1 γ
d2
i2 . . . γ
dn
in = 1 for each i = 1, . . . , t which is
equivalent to the system of congruences
d1li1 + d2li2 + . . .+ dnlin ≡ 0 (mod q − 1)
for each i = 1, . . . , t.
If the numbers lij are determined (say using discrete logarithms), then the last
system can be solved using integer programming since it is equivalent to the system
d1li1 + d2li2 + . . .+ dnlin + dn+i(q − 1) = 0
for each i = 1, . . . , t in integer variables d1, . . . , dn+t.
A monomial invariant f = xd11 x
d2
2 . . . x
dn
n separates vectors ~vi and ~vj if and only
if
ad1i1 a
d2
i2 . . . a
dn
in 6= ad1j1ad2j2 . . . adnjn .
We have seen that, for F a finite field, the fact that F× is cyclic allows the use
of the discrete logarithm, which is computationally difficult but standard crypto-
graphic tool.
If G was cyclic it was enough to find any invariant of G randomly and check if it
separates S. If G is not cyclic then more systematic knowledge of invariants of cyclic
subgroups of G is necessary and breaking of the cryptosystem based on noncyclic
group G seems more complicated than the case of the cyclic group G. Additionally,
it is not clear if there is a separating invariant based on two variables analogous as
in Proposition 3.5 in the case of noncyclic group G. Therefore using noncyclic G
gives an advantage from the point of view of the security of the cryptosystem based
on invariants of G.
The setup will be even more complicated if the underlying structure of F is not
cyclic. After we investigate the minimal degree of polynomial invariants (question
related to a linear algebra attack on the cryptosystem) in the next section, we turn
our attention to fields F of characteristic zero. We will introduce a cryptosystem
the security of which will depend on the fastorization properties in the number field
F . Afterward, we will use residue classes of F and replace F by a finite commutative
ring R with a complicated multiplicative structure that will not allow an obvious
use of the discrete logarithms. In the cases of the number field F and the residue
ring R, the nature of finding invariants of G is different from discrete logarithm
problem. This is clear in the case of a number field F . The residue residue ring R
have divisors of zeros and the multiplicative group U of its units is not cyclic.
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3.6.1. Encryption based on discrete logarithm one-way functions. We would like to
make a small detour from the invariant-based cryptosytems and discuss cryptosys-
tems based on discrete logarithms that are inspired by Examples 3.3 and 3.6.
Assume that Alice chooses a finitely generated group G acting on a set M . Let
{g1, . . . , gm} be a set of generators of G. Alice chooses a subset M0 ⊂M such that
any orbit Gm for m ∈M intersects M0 in exactly one point. (The set of all blocks
of plaintext that can be transmitted by Bob is injectively mapped to M0.) Alice
chooses a map f : M →M0 that is constant on each orbit Gm of G and retains it
as a private key. Obviously f restricted on M0 is an identity. She announces, as a
public key, the (effectively described) set M0 and the group G, by announcing its
generators g1, . . . , gm.
To encode a block of plaintext m ∈ M0, Bob choses a random element g ∈ G
(by multiplying some of the generators g1, . . . , gm), and computes m
′ = gm which
he transmits to Alice.
Alice decrypts the message by applying the map f as f(m′) = f(gm) = f(m) =
m.
Example 3.7. Consider the ElGamal cryptosystem with cyclic group C of order
n, generator α ∈ C, private key b ∈ {0, 1 . . . , n − 1} and the public key {α, β, n},
where β = αb. The group C coincides with the set of all blocs of plaintext that can
be send by Bob to Alice. A cryptosystem is contructed as follows. Let M = C ×C,
considered as a group with respect to the mutiplication induced by the diagonal action
of C, and let G to be its cyclic subgroup generated by (α, β). Then G acts on M by
multiplication. We set M0 = C and the map f :M →M0 to be f(x, y) = yx−b.
Example 3.8. Let A be an abelian group generated by α1, α2 ∈ A. Let β = αb11 αb22
for some b1, b2 ∈ N. Let M = A × A × A and G be its cyclic subgroup generated
by the element (α1, α2, β). We set M0 = A and the map f : M → M0 to be
f(x, y, z) = zx−b1y−b2 .
Alice announces the groupA and the vector (α1, α2, β) as a public key. To encode
a block of plaintext m ∈ A, Bob chooses a random number e ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}
and transmits the vector (α1, α2, β)
e(1, 1,m) = (αe1, α
e
2, β
em) to Alice.
Alice decrypts the message m as f(αe1, α
e
2, β
em) = βemα−eb11 α
−eb2
2 = m.
This encryption produces a 3:1 expansion in size from plaintext to ciphertext.
The security of this cryptosystem depends on the ability of the evesdropper
Charlie to solve the equation β = αx11 α
x2
2 , for integers x1 and x2. If we work over
a finite field F = FG(q), then we can we can use the discrete logarithms in F× to
express α1, α2 and β as powers of the primitive element a of F
×, say αi = a
ei and
β = ae. Then the equation β = αx11 α
x2
2 reduces to a congruence e = e1x1 + e2x2
(mod q − 1). Therefore we require the discrete logarithm assumption to guard
against this attack.
4. Minimal degree of polynomial invariants of G
When we described the design of the cryptosystem based on invariants we have
already remarked that its security depends on the difficulty of finding an invariant
f ′ of the group H separating vectors in S.
When we are working over a ground field F of characteristic zero, then the
condition that f ′ separates vi and vj for i 6= j might not be difficult to satisfy
because the set of polynomials in F [V ], that take on different values when evaluated
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at vi and vj , is open in the Zariski topology. Therefore it is likely that a randomly
chosen invariant f ′ of H will separate elements of S in this case. Therefore when
F has characteristic zero, we need not be concerned whether f ′ separates vectors
from S.
This is contrary to the situation over finite fields when it was easy to find an
invariant of G but difficult to satisfy the condition that it separates elements of S.
4.1. Guarding against the linear algebra attack. Denote by MG,V , or simply
by MG or M if we need not emphasise the group G or the vector space V it
is acting on the minimal positive degree of an invariant from F [V ]G. That is
MG,V = min{d > 0|F [V ]Gd 6= 0}. If F [V ]G = F , then we set MG,V =∞.
The notion of the minimal positive degree of an invariant and the value of
M = MG,V are important for the security of the invariant-based cryptosystem
(both variants one and two) we are considering. For example, if we know that
MG is so small that m
(
n+M−1
M
)
= O(nr) is polynomial in n, then Charlie can find
an invariant f ′ of G in polynomial time by solving consecutive linear systems for
d = 1, . . . ,
(
n+M−1
M
)
, each consisting of m
(
n+d−1
d
)
equations in the
(
n+d−1
d
)
vari-
ables described in the previous section. For a fixed d, this can be accomplished
in time O(m(
(
n+d−1
d
)
)4) and the total search will take no more than time O(n8r).
Therefore, for the security of the system it must be guaranteed that m
(
n+M−1
M
)
is
not polynomial in n.
4.2. Finding a polynomial invariant of G. We will now discuss an algorithm
that will enable us to find an invariant f ′ of G (and to break the cryptosystem if
char F is zero). The algorithm works inductively, and as a special case, it works
when G is a finite group. We will apply this algorithm when char F is zero but it
works even when the characteristic of F is finite.
Assume that H is a subgroup of G of finite index in G. Assuming we know a
nonzero invariant f of H , we will find a nonzero invariant of G.
Lemma 4.1. Let H be a subgroup of G of finite index s in G such that f is an
invariant of H of degree t. Then G has a nonzero invariant of degree not exceeding
sMH that can be found in time O(sn
t+2
(
n+t−1
t
)s+1
).
Proof. Denote by g1, . . . , gs, where s = [G : H ], representatives of all coset classes
of G/H . Let f be an invariant of H of degree MH . Denote xi = gif for i = 1, . . . s,
and denote by ps(x1, . . . , xs) = x1 . . . xs the s-th elementary symmetric function
in x1, . . . , xs. It is easy to see that ps(x1, . . . , xs) is invariant with respect to G,
because each element g ∈ G permutes coset classes of G/H , hence it permutes
the set of polynomials {x1, . . . , xs}. Also, the polynomial ps(x1, . . . , xs) = x1 . . . xs
is nonzero and has the degree sMH . We can evaluate all polynomials xi in time
O(sn2
(
n+t−1
t
)
nt). The product of all xi can be computed in time O(
(
n+t−1
t
)s
). 
Corollary 4.2. If G is a group of finite order s, then the algorithm in the proof of
the previous lemma (applied to H = 1) produces a nonzero invariant of G of order
not exceeding s which can be computed in time O(sn3ns+1).
Note that the time required to run the computation is exponential in the order
of G if no invariant of a subgroup of G is known and when we attempt to find an
invariant of G from H = 1. Nevertheless, there are cases when an invariant of H
can be computed in polynomial time; see the next lemma.
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The following lemma is well-known, see [5].
Lemma 4.3. If G ⊂ GLn(R) and G is finite, then G has an invariant of degree
two.
Proof. Let g1 = 1, . . . , gs be all elements of G and R[V ] = R[t1, . . . , tn]. Denote
by xi = gi(t
2
1 + . . . + t
2
n) for i = 1, . . . , s. Since values of each xi are non-negative
when evaluated as polynomials in t1, . . . , tn, the values of the invariant polynomial∑s
i=1 xi evaluated as polynomial in t1, . . . , tn are non-negative and they can be
equal to zero only if each xi is zero. But x1 = 0 only if t1 = . . . = tn = 0. Therefore∑s
i=1 xi is a positive-definite quadratic form in t1, . . . , tn, hence a non-zero invariant
of G. 
It follows from the previous section that a quadratic invariant of the group
H , within a context of our public-key cryptosystem, can be found using linear
algebra techniques in the polynomial time in n. Therefore, for the security of the
cryptosystem, we need to make sure that if H is finite, then it is not represented
by matrices with real coefficients.
4.3. Lower bounds for degrees of polynomial invariants. The significance
of understanding the minimal degree MG,V of invariants for the security of the
invariant-based cryptosystem was established above. In particular, it is important
to find a nontrivial lower bound for MG,V . Unfortunately, we are not aware of any
articles establishing lower bounds for the minimal degree of invariants, except in
very special circumstances, e.g. [12].
On the other hand, there are numerous upper bounds for the minimal degree
β(G, V ) such that F [V ]G is generated as an algebra by all invariants in degrees not
exceeding β(G, V ). For example, a classical result of Noether [20] states that if the
characteristic of F is zero and G is finite of order |G|, then β(G, V ) ≤ |G|. There
is an extensive discussion of Noether bound and results about β(G, V ) in section 3
of [24]. It was conjectured by Kemper that for G 6= 1, and arbitratry ground field
F , the number β(G, V ) is at most dim V (|G| − 1). Recently, this conjecture was
proved by Symonds in [26].
When one wants to find an invariant of G, it seems natural to consider an upper
bound β(G, V ). However, if we wants to show that there are no invariants of small
degrees (as is our case), then we need to find lower bounds for MG,V . Until now,
there was no real impetus to consider such problem. We have investigated minimal
degree of invariants of G in general in [15], where we have obtained its description
for certain groups G.
5. Cryptosystems based on invariants of infinite diagonalizable
groups
In this section we assume that the characteristic of the ground field F is zero
and we design and ivestigate the properties of a cryptosystem based on invariants
of an infinite diagonalizable group.
Let us fix a number field F = Q(θ) and the subring Z = Z[θ] of the ring of
algebraic integers of Q(θ). Choose a finite set Q of integers of cardinality q and
a set Sm = {p1, . . . , pm} of elements of Z. The elements pi of Sm need not be
primitive and could be units of Z. Denote by Pm the set of all products of elements
from the set Sm.
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5.1. Design of the cryptosystems. To start, Alice chooses sets Q and Sm as
above. Afterwards, she chooses her secret key, which is the n-tuple of nonnegative
integers (e1, . . . , en), where one component, say en equals 1. Then she will construct
a set of generators t1, . . . , ts of T in such a way that the monomial f = x
e1
1 . . . x
en
n
is invariant under the action of each ti, hence belongs to F [V ]
T .
At the i-th step of the process, Alice chooses the i-th generator ti of the group
T as follows.
First, for every k = 1, . . . ,m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 she chooses numbers b(i)k,j
from the set Q. Then she computes the numbers a
(i)
1 , . . . , a
(i)
n−1 from the set Pm as
a
(i)
j =
∏m
k=1 p
b
(i)
k,j
k where 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. Alice then computes a(i)n in such a way that
the diagonal matrix gi = diag(a
(i)
1 , . . . , a
(i)
n ) has f = x
e1
1 . . . x
en
n as an invariant.
Since she has chosen en = 1, it is easy to see that the appropriate value of a
(i)
n is
a
(i)
n =
∏n−1
j=1 (a
(i)
j )
−ej .
Once all generators ti of the group T are constructed, Alice chooses an invertible
n× n matrix P as a part of her secret key and computes conjugates gi = PtiP−1.
Alice then announces the diagonalizable group G given by its generators gi for
i = 1, . . . , s.
When she receives the encrypted message, she can use her secret key P to switch
from G to T and apply her previously chosen invariant f = xe11 . . . x
en
n of T to
decrypt the message, as explained in section 2. She knows that f is an invariant of
T because T was constructed to satisfy that condition.
To remove the randomnes of the choice made during this process, Alice should
use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator.
5.2. How to break the cryptosystems in partial cases. We will explain how
the above cryptosystem could be broken in the polynomial time for some rings Z.
Lemma 5.1. Assume that a ring Z is such that the group of units of Z is finite,
Z is an Euclidean domain, and the Euclidean algorithm over Z runs in polynomial
time in its input. If a vector, encrypted by the above cryptosystem, has no zero
components, then it can be decrypted in polynomial time.
Proof. If the group of units of Z is finite, then it consists of roots of unity. Assume
that it is generated by ζE .
At first, we compute the characteristic polynomials of all matrices gi and find all
of their eigenvalues. This can be done in polynomial time using the algorithm for
factoring a polynomial over a number field described in Section 3.6.2. of [6]. Hence
the factorization of all characteristic polynomials can be done in polynomial time
in n. Then, we follow the algorithm explained in the proof of Proposition 15.4 of
[14] and simultaneously diagonalize all matrices gi and obtain generators t
′
i of the
conjugate group T ′ consisting of diagonal matrices. For simplicity of notation, we
can assume that T ′ = T . Actually, what is important for us are only the eigenvalues
a
(i)
1 , . . . , a
(i)
n and their order with respect to fixed order of the eigenvectors. We will
not work with the actual eigenvectors of V .
Since all eigenvalues are ratios of elements from Z, we can consider the set X
of integers that appear in the numerators or denominators of any eigenvalue of any
matrix ti. Using Euclidean algorithm we can compute the set Y of all greatest
common divisors of all pairs of elements from X . Then we can write a partial
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factorization of all elements of X in the form where x = yz and y is a product
of elements from Y and Z is not divisible by any element from Y . Afterward we
replaceX by a new set X ′ consisting of all elements in Y and of elements z from the
above factorization. In the next step we replace the set Y by the set Y ′ consisting
of all greatest common divisors of all pairs of elements from X ′. We continue in
the same fashion and after finitely many steps this process will stabilize. Then we
arrive at a set Y (d) of numbers that are pairwise coprime divisors of integers from
X . Let us call elements of Y (d) atoms of X and denote them by {a1, . . . am′}. Since
the Euclidean algorithm in Z runs in polynomial time in n and there are no more
than qm steps of the above process, we find the atoms in polynomial time in n.
For every atom a, every element x of X is either coprime to a, or is writ-
ten as x = alb, where b is coprime to a. Every a
(i)
j has the atom factorization
a
(i)
j = ζ
ei,j
E
∏m′
k=1 a
b
′(i)
k,j
k , where 0 ≤ ei,j < E. We can find an invariant of T from
the structure of these diagonal matrices by solving, in nonnegative integers, the
system of s equations
∏m
j=1(a
(i)
j )
yj = 1 in n variables. Since Charlie has the atom
factorization of each element a
(i)
j , he can compare the exponents in the atom fac-
torization and obtain a system of s(m′ + 1) linear equations
∑m′
j=1 b
′(i)
k,j yj = 0 and∑m′
j=1 ei,jyj = 0 with bounded coefficients b
′(i)
k,j and ei,j in n variables yj . An integer
solution of this system can be found in polynomial time in n - see subsection 1.5.2
of [7].
The task to find a nonnegative integer solution of the linear system with integer
coefficients is an NP-complete problem. If a solution of our system that has all
nonnegative components is found, then it corresponds to a polynomial invariant of
G.
However, every integral solution corresponds to a rational invariant, that is a
rational function that is invariant under the G-action. If the intercepted encoded
vector has no zero coordinates, then Charlie can use his rational invariants to decode
the message. 
Let us remark that the assumption of the above lemma are satisfied for integers
Z = Z or Gaussian integers Z = Z[i]. It is well known that the Euclidean algorithm
runs in polynomial time over Z and Z[i]. For a survey of algorithmic results see
Section 3 of [1]. Also, the above results can be extended further if we replace
the assumption that Z is Euclidean domain by the assumption that Z is complex
quadratic unique factorization domain. According to [16] there is an algorithm,
running in polynomial time, that computes gcd in such rings Z.
5.3. Theory of divisibility and units in algebraic number fields. Assume
that F is a number field, that is a finite extension of the field Q of rational numbers.
Let Z be a ring of algebraic integers of F . In many rings Z factorization of elements
into primes is not unique (hence Z are not unique factorization domains), see for
example the case when F = Q(
√−5) in 2.3 of [3].
Recall the theory of divisibility essentially due to Kummer from Section 3 of [3].
We replace an element a ∈ Z by the principal ideal (a) of Z generated by a. The
ring Z is a Dedekind domain and it has a theory of divisors. I particular, each ideal
a of Z can be written uniquely as a product a = p1 . . . pr, where pi for i = 1, . . . r
are prime ideals of Z. The ideals a and b of Z are called equivalent if there exists
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α ∈ Z× such that a = b(α). The set of all equivalency classes is called the class
group of F . It is a finite group of order h, called the class number of F . The ring
Z is a unique factorization domain if and only if h = 1.
In relation to factorization of elements from Z it is important to recall the
structure of the group U of units of Z. By the Dirichlet theorem, if r is the number
of real embeddings of F and s is the number of complex embeddings of F , then the
group is isomorphic to a product of a finite group of roots of unity and a free group
of rank r + s− 1, whose generators are called fundamental units of Z.
5.4. Security issue - the choice of the ring Z. The choice of the ring Z is
perhaps the most critical since the security of the cryptosystem depends heavily on
the arithmetic of the ring Z.
The atom or prime factorisation analogous to the one considered in the proof
of Lemma 5.1 is not available in suitable form for number fields in general. For
simplicity assume that Z = Z[θ] coincides with the ring of algebraic integers of the
fieldQ(θ). If Z is a principal ideal domain but not a Euclidean domain, then we have
a factorization of every element of Z into a product of primitive elements and units
of Z. However, without the Euclidean algorithm, it is not clear if we can produce
prime factorization of principal ideal in polynomial time. If Z is not a principal ideal
domain, then instead of primitive elements we need to work with divisors. Namely,
for each x ∈ Z there is the prime ideal decomposition (x) = p1 . . . pl, where pi are
(not necessarily principal) ideals in Z. An ideal generated by each prime number
p splits up to a product of many prime ideals (their number does not exceed the
degree of the extension [Q(θ) : Q], and this number is attained for totally ramified
primes p). The problem of finding the prime ideal factorization in Z is very difficult.
Its special case for F = Q is the prime factorization problem in Z. The difficulty
of factoring of a product of two large primes is the basis of the RSA public-key
cryptosystem. We should consider only those rings Z = Z[θ] for which their class
number is bigger than one. Such ring Z is not a unique factorization domain (and
consequently not a principal ideal domain and not an Euclidean domain).
Even if we assume that the prime factorization of principal ideals generated by
a
(i)
j is known, by itself it would not be enough to break the above system. The
additional difficulty lies in the structure of the group of units of Z. For example, if
we choose all elements of Sm to be units of Z, then the whole idea of atom or prime
decomposition is utterly useless. In order to facilitate the conversion into a system
of linear equations, we would need to determine a factorization of each appearing
unit into a product of roots or unity and fundamental units of the ring Z. Finding
a set of fundamental units of the ring Z and decomposition of units of Z into
products of root of unity and fundamental units is by itself a very difficult problem
and we are not aware of any algorithm solving these problems in polynomial time.
Therefore the break described in Lemma 5.1 cannot be duplicated for rings Z that
are not unique factorization domains or those containing units of infinite orders.
We remark that there is a plethora of examples of such rings Z appearing in the
algebraic number theory.
A combination of obstacles related to factorization of principal ideals and factor-
ization of units of Z as a product of fundamental units is the reason why we propose
the above cryptosystem based on approprately selected Z. We are unable to find a
polynomial algorithm for finding an invariant of the corresponding diagonalizable
group G.
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To summarize, we need to choose the ring Z in such a way that it is not a unique
factorization domain and preferably such that its class number is high. There are
numerous examples of rings of integers of number fields that satisfy this condition.
Secondly, we should choose Z so that the rank of its group of units is high. Using
Dirichlet theorem, this condition is easy to satisfy.
5.5. Other security issues. We will consider other possible choices Alice can
make and how they affect the security of the system. The additional choices that
affect the security of the crytosystem (besides the choice of Z) are the following.
5.5.1. The choice of the set Sm. We could choose elements pi from the set Sm in
such a way that some of them are primitive. Also, we should choose them in such
a way their norms will have many common prime factors p. If we chose them
randomly, then there is a great probability that the prime ideals dividing p in the
prime decomposition of different pi are actually different. Also, we could choose
some elements of Sm to be units of Z in order to involve the structure of units of
Z.
5.5.2. Choice of the set Q. A choice of a finite set Q does not seem to be important
hence we can take it to be small, for example Q = {−1, 0, 1}.
5.5.3. The choice of the secret key (e1, . . . , en). Another important requirement we
need to impose is that none of the entries (e1, . . . , en) vanishes. The reason for this
is to guarantee that the invariant f we chose depends on all the variables x1, . . . , xn.
While we cannot guarantee that there are no invariants of G built on fewer than
n variables, chosing our invariant f that depends on all variables is a reasonable
precaution. When we increase the number of generators ti of T , it is more likely
that T would not have invariants depending on small number of variables. A more
careful analysis of this relationship would be desirable.
In order to prevent linear algebra attacks described in Section 4.1, the secret key
(e1, . . . , en) must be chosen so that E =
∑n
i=1 ei is at least of the order of n. For
example she can choose ei ∈ {1, 2} such that
∑n
i=1 ei = [
3n
2 ]. See also 5.6 a) below.
5.5.4. Choice of the exponents b
(i)
k,j. We would like to make sure that the minimal
degree MT is close to E, which is the degree of f , or at least of the order n.
However, if the number s of generators t is high and all exponents b
(i)
k,j are chosen
randomly, we expect that MT is going to be of order n. It is an interesting problem
to investigate how to choose b
(i)
k,j to guarantee that MT is sufficiently large, say
bigger than E/2.
If we cannot gurantee that MT is of order n, then we can add another generator
diag(ζE , . . . , ζE) to T . That would require replacing the field Q(θ) by Q(θ, ζE) and
chainging the ring Z.
This would give away to Charlie the degree of our invariant f but it would also
make sure that MT = E. Since E is of order n, this prevents the linear algebra
break discussed in subsection 4.1.
5.5.5. The choice of the transition matrix P . The idea of using conjugate group
G instead of T is to make matrices representing elements g ∈ G as far away from
the diagonal matrices as possible. Therefore the matrix P should be complicated,
and with many nonzero entries, in order to accomplish this. Please see the next
subsection 5.6 part b) about the security of conjugation by P .
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5.6. Possible attacks. We will now describe possible attacks on the above cryp-
tosystem.
a) Linear algebra attack
Charlie might attempt to find an invariant of G directly using the linear algebra
attack described in Section 4.1. The complexity of this approach is exponential in n
ifMG is of the order of n, which is likely going to be the case due to (random) choices
of a
(i)
j and which can be guaranteed by adding another generator diag(ζn, . . . , ζn)
to T . Therefore this linear algebra attack is ineffective.
b) Finding the conjugate group T
Charlie might attempt to find a conjugate group T ′ of G, consisting of diagonal
matrices. In order to diagonalize G, he would find all eigenvalues of elements gj by
computing their characteristic polynomials, which he can do in polynomial time in
n. There exists a polynomial algorithm for factoring a polynomial over a number
field - it is described in Section 3.6.2. of [6]. Hence the factorization of all charac-
teristic polynomials can be done in polynomial time in n. Once the eigenvalues of
matrices corresponding to every gi are computed, he can simultaneously diagonalize
all matrices gi (see the proof of Proposition 15.4 of [14]) and obtain the generators
of a group T ′, in polynomial time in n.
This suggests that the conjugation by P , suggested in [10] as a way of ”hiding”
the group G and its invariants, is not secure without our context.
c) Finding an invariant using ideal and units factorisation
For rings Z, that are non-Euclidean or have infinite group of units, the attack
described in Lemma 5.1 is not viable.
5.7. Possible modification of the system. We have seen before that switching
from the system of equations
∏m
j=1(a
(i)
j )
yj = 1 to the linear system
∑m
j=1 b
(i)
k,jyj = 0
is important for possible breaking of the system. This can be accomplished by prime
ideal factorization - see 5.6 c) above. One possibility to prevent this method is to
choose the numbers a
(i)
j to be arbitrary and random complex numbers. Then the
corresponding linear system would consists of equations
∑m
j=1 log(a
(i)
j )yj = 0. It
appears to be difficult to find a solution of such general system in integers.
On the other hand for computational purposes we need to approximate the num-
bers a
(i)
j by complex numbers with finite decimal expansions. This would create
difficulty estimating errors of the encryption process. For such system it would
be necessary to estimate possible error of encryption and also it would be neces-
sary that the vectors vi from the set Sused in the encryption process could be
distinguishable within the errors of such computations.
5.8. More general systems considered in [11]. The main reason we were able
to design a system for diagonalizable groups was that we were able to easily con-
struct matrices that have a given monomial as its invariants. In the case of finite
diagonalizable G, a reasonable description of the invariants for diagonal matrices
is given in [15]. For infinite diagonalizable G the situation is similar but we have
equations instead of congruences.
One could hope that designing a system based on nonabelian G would be more
secure than that based on a diagonalizable group T because it is more complicated
to find invariants of such G than those of T . A system based on invariants of
nonabelian group G would have an advantage that simultaneous diagonalization
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as described in 5.6 b) is not possible. Therefore the conjugation problem is more
difficult to solve for nonabelian G. Also, we need to take into account that the
minimal degree of G must be at least of order n to prevent linear algebra attacks.
In the paper [11] the authors have proposed a process of generating a more
complicated (nonabelian) group G, its representation and a corresponding invariant
starting from simpler groups using four types of operations. Their main idea was
that it would be more difficult to find an invariant of G than that of the simpler
groups. We will investigate how this construction affects the minimal degrees of
invariants since they are important in regard to the possible linear algebra attack
on the corresponding cryptosystem described in subsection 4.1.
For the first operation, assume that G ≤ GL(V ), where V ≃ Rn is a free
module over a ring R of rank n; and a ring homomorphism π : R → R′, replacing
R with a new ring R′, are given. If R′ is a direct summand of R and π is a
projection onto R′ (in which case R′ is called smaller), then every invariant of
R[V ]G remains an invariant of R′[π(V )]G, hence this operation does not increase
the minimal degree MG,V . If R is embedded into R
′, then R[V ]G ⊆ R′[R′ ⊗R V ]G,
hence MG,R′⊗RV ≤ MG,V . The authors of [11] do not specify what they mean
when R′ is larger, and we were unable to follow their arguments. However, if the
kernel of the map π is nontrivial, then some of the invariants can be annihilated
using this process and the minimal degree can potentially increase.
The second operation replaces G by a conjugated subgroupH = h−1Gh for some
h ∈ GL(V ). Since the algebras/rings R[V ]G and R[V ]H are isomorphic, we have
the equality of the minimal degrees MG,V =MH,V .
The third operation requires two groups G1 ≤ GL(V1) and G2 ≤ GL(V2) and
replaces them by their direct product G1 × G2 embedded in a natural way into
GL(V1 ⊕ V2). In this case the isomorhism R[V1 ⊕ V2]G1×G2 ≃ R[V1]G1 ⊗ R[V2]G2
implies MG1×G2,V1⊕V2 = min{MG1,V1 ,MG2,V2}, thus the minimal degree will not
increase.
Finally, the fourth operation replaces G by the wreath product L = G ≀H , where
H is a subgroup of the symmetric group Sm. The group L can be identified with
the set of all m + 1-tuples (g1, . . . , gm, σ), where g1, . . . , gm ∈ G and σ ∈ H . The
above element of L acts on V ⊕m by the rule
(g1, . . . , gm, σ)(v1, . . . , vm) = (g1vσ(1), . . . , gmvσ(m)).
The subgroup consisting of all elements with σ = 1 is normal and it is isomorphic to
the direct productGm and L is isomorphic to the semi-direct productH⋉Gm. Then
R[V ⊕m]L = (R[V ⊕m]G
m
)H = ((R[V ]G)⊗m)H and, for any invariants f1, . . . , fm
from R[V ]G, the element∑
1⊗ . . .⊗ fi︸︷︷︸
i−th place
⊗ . . .⊗ 1
is L-invariant. Therefore ML,V ⊕m ≤MG,V .
Summing up, all four operations as presented in [11] do not increase the minimal
degrees of invariants of given representations of the initial groups (possibly with the
exception of the first operation with non-injective map π). Therefore, regardless
of how complicated the resulting group G and its representation is, it is no more
secured against the linear algebra attack described in subsection 4.1 and great
care needs to be taken that the initial minimal degrees of the starting groups are
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large enough, say of the order n. On the other hand, if the minimal degrees of
the starting group is sufficiently large, then from the point of view of such linear
algebra attack it is not necessary to construct a more (structurally) complicated
group or representation.
5.9. Invariants of supergroups. Another possible modification of the cryptosys-
tem is obtained when the group G and its invariants are replaced by a supergroup
and its superinvariants. A significant difference that is exhibited in this case is that
invariants of supergroups do not have a basis consting of monomials. Thus the
structure of the invariants of supergroups is more complicated.
We will not go further into rather complicated details about supergroups and
their invariants but would like to refer an interested reader to the paper [15] where
we have obtained results in this direction and stated potential application in cryp-
tosystems based on relative invariants and absolute invariants of supergroups.
6. Cryptosystem over finite rings R
In order to make the cryptosystem build in Section 5 more effective and easier
to implement we will make modification that will work over finite rings R instead
of over fields F .
The motivating example is the residue class ring R of the ring of algebraic fields
modulo an integer m > 1. However we can consider cryptosystem over arbitrary
finite commutative ring R.
6.1. Structure theory for finite commutative rings R. Recall the following
structure theorems for finite commutative, finite local commutative rings and their
groups of units from [18].
Theorem 6.1. (Theorem VI.2 of [18]) Let R be a finite commutative ring. Then
R is isomorphic to a direct sum of local rings.
Theorem 6.2. (Theorems XVII.1 and XVIII.2 of [18]) Let R be a finite local
commutative ring of characteristic pn with maximal ideal m and residue field k. Let
[k : Zp] = r and u1, . . . , ut be a minimal R-generating set of m. Then the largest
Galois extension T (called the coefficient ring of R) of Zp in R is isomorphic to the
Galois ring GR(pn, r), and R is a ring homomorphic image of the polynomial ring
T [X1, . . . , Xt].
The group of units R× of R is isomorphic to (1+m)× k×. The Abelian p-group
1 +m is called the one group of R.
Gilmer has characterized when R× is cyclic.
Theorem 6.3. (Theorem XVIII.9 of [18]) Let R be a finite local commutative ring.
Then R× is cyclic if and only if 1 + m is cyclic. In this case R is isomorphic to
one of the following
• GF (pt) (if m = 0)
• Z/pnZ (if p ≥ 3 and n > 1)
• Z/4Z
• (Z/pZ)[X ]/(X2)
• (Z/2Z)[X ]/(X3)
• (Z/4Z)[X ]/(2X,X2 − 2)
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Hence in most cases R× is not cyclic.
We will work with finite rings R obtained as residue rings of the ring of algebraic
integers Z of number fields F modulo an ideal a of Z; and specialize further to the
case when a = (m) and m ∈ Z.
The structure of units U(R) of the residue classes R of Z modulo a power of a
prime ideal p is rather complicated and described in Theorem 2 and 3 of [19]. For
simplicity we quote here only Theorem 1 of [19] describing the p-rank of U(Z/pN+1).
Let p be a prime ideal of Z dividing a prime number p of Q, e and f be the
ramification index and the degree of p over Q. Denote by e1 = [
e
p−1 ]. The following
statement is due to Hasse and Takenouchi.
Theorem 6.4. (Theorem 1 of [19]) The p-rank RN of U(Z/p
N+1) is given by
• (N − [N
p
])f if 0 ≤ N < e+ e1
• ef if N ≥ e+ e1 and the primitive p-th root of unity does not belong to the
p-adic completion Fp
• ef + 1 if N ≥ e + e1 and the primitive p-th root of unity belongs to the
p-adic completion Fp.
An interesting connection of the structure U(Z/a) to multiplicative semigroups
and Fermat-Euler theorem in algebraic number field is given in [17].
6.2. Modification of the cryptosystem to finite rings. Assume that F is a
number field, that is a finite extension of the field Q of rational numbers. Let Z be
a ring of algebraic integers of F .
Let a = pk11 . . . p
kr
r , where pi for i = 1, . . . r are distinct prime ideals of Z and
ki are the corresponding multiplicities. We say that elements α, β ∈ Z are called
congruent modulo a, and write α ≡ β (mod a) if α − β is divisible by a. The
equivalence classes of this congruence form a residue class ring R = Z/a. Then R
is a finite commutative ring that is isomorphic to a direct sum of local rings Z/pkii .
If p has the degree of inertia f , then the norm Norm(p) = pf for a rational prime p
and the cardinality of the local ring Z/pk is pfk. In particular, the residue class ring
Z/p is a finite field of cardinality q = pf . This way we have a concrete realization of
the structure theorem for finite commutative rings for residue class rings R = Z/a.
There is a theory of divisors on R induced from the theory of divisors on Z. The
finite ringR has divisors of zero and the ideals ofR are in one-to-one correspondence
to ideals of Z dividing a. Thus R has r distinct prime ideals pi for i = 1, . . . , r and
the product pk11 . . . pr
kr vanishes.
6.2.1. Choice of the ring R and its ideal a. Let us make the following observation.
Proposition 6.5. Let Z be the ring of algebraic integers of a number field F , and
a be an ideal of Z. Then the residue class ring R = Z/a is a principal ideal ring
that is isomorphic to a finite product of local rings.
Proof. Let a = pk11 . . . p
kr
r , where pi for i = 1, . . . r are distinct prime ideals of Z
and ki are the corresponding multiplicities.
For each i = 1, . . . , r denote by Zi the localization of Z with respect to the prime
ideal pi and by Ri = Zi/p
ki
i the local ring with the maximal ideal piRi. It follows
from the Chinese remainder theorem that the map φ : R → ∏ri=1 Ri that sends x
(mod a) to (x (mod pkii ))
r
i=1 is an isomorphism of rings. Moreover, the groups of
units U(R) of R and U(
∏r
i=1 Ri) are isomorphic under this map.
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Ideals b of R are of the form pl11 . . . p
kr
r , where 0 ≤ li ≤ ki for each i = 1, . . . , r.
If we choose elements πi such that π ∈ pi \ p2i (πi uniform element with respect
to the valuation of Z corresponding to pi) and πi ≡ 1 (mod pj) for j 6= i (this is
possible by the Chinese remainder theorem), then b = (
∏r
i=1 π
li
i ). 
Let us note that the groups of units U(R) of R and U(
∏r
i=1Ri) =
∏r
i=1 U(Ri)
are also isomorphic under the map φ, and each group U(Ri) is cyclic and isomorphic
to the group of units of the finite field Z/pi.
It might appear that due to the above Proposition, when we pass from the ring
Z that is not a unique factorization domain (when its class number h > 1) to the
residue class ring R = Z/a, the bad properties of factorization in Z do not carry
over to R since R is a principal ideal ring.
However, the complexity of the divisor theory of R, together with a suitable
choice of a, indeed influences the complexity of the structure of R. If the number r
of primary factors pkii and/or the exponents ki are high and the factorization of a
is not available, it will be difficult to derive the structure of R effectively from the
ring Z and its ideal a.
Determining the abstract structure of an arbitrary finite ring R seems to be even
more complicated problem.
Based on this disussion, we should choose the residue ring R and its ideal a in
such a way that the number r of primary components of a is high and the prime
factorization pk11 . . . pr
kr of a in Z is complicated.
We will consider only the case when R = Z/(m) for the ring of algebraic inte-
gers of a number field F and integer m > 1. The choice of F and m cannot be
independent since even if Z has a complicated theory of divisors, choosing wrong
m can create R that is rather simple.
We will now modify previously defined cryptosystem based on invariants of diag-
onalizable matrices to the case when R is the residue class ring R = Z/(m) where
Z is the ring of algebraic integers of a number field F and m is an integer.
However, we start with F with complicated divisor theory and then look for
appropriate m so that the structure of the residue ring Z/(m) contains the compli-
cation of the factorization in Z and also problem of the factorization of the modulus
m.
Let m = pd11 . . . p
ds
s and each pi decomposes as pi = p
e1,i
1,i . . . ps,i
es,i in Z. Let us
consider the following cases for m.
1) m is square-free. In particular, one appealing choice is when m is a product
of two large primes p1 and p2. In this case the ring R will be a direct sum of finite
fields corresponding to residue class rings of Z by unramified prime divisors of m.
We should choose the prime factors of m to be unramified in F because otherwise
it would be easier to factor m by considering the greatest common divisor of m and
the discriminant of Z. Special case to consider is when either p1, p2 or both are
totally unramified.
If we want to involve local rings that are not finite fields in the decomposition
of R, we have additional choices for m.
2) We can choose m that is not square-free. For example, we can choose m =
(p1p2)
2, where both p1 and p2 are large primes. In this case we have the factorization
problem for p1p2 but since m is not square-free, it is much easier to find prime
factorization of m when compared to the square-free case.
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If we consider a more general case and replace the integer m by an ideal a
(principal or not) of Z such that a = pk11 . . . p
kr
r , then the structure of U(Z/a) is
even more complicated because the group of units of the local rings Zi/(p
ki
i ) might
have high p-rank if the exponents ki are high.
6.2.2. Choice of the group G. Assume that we have already chosen Z, m and the
corresponding complicated residue ring R = Z/(m). Let us modify the cryptosys-
tem introduced in 5.1 in such a way that instead of working inside the ring Z we
will work inside the residue ring R = Z/(m).
We will assume that the entries in the matrices representing generators gi of
G are units of R. Assume that the group of units U of the ring R has a basis
given by u1, . . . , ur of respective orders o1, . . . , or, generators gi of G are given as
gi =


ri1 0 . . . 0
0 ri2 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . rin

 for i = 1, . . . t, where rij = ulij11 . . . ulijrr for appropriate
exponents lijk, and the set S consists of vectors ~vi =


ai1
ai2
. . .
ain

 for i = 1, . . . , s. The
general element of G is written as g = gy11 . . . g
yt
t for some integers y1, . . . , yt.
A monomial f = xd11 x
d2
2 . . . x
dn
n separates ~vi and ~vj if and only if
ad1i1 a
d2
i2 . . . a
dn
in 6= ad1j1ad2j2 . . . adnjn .
Since every invariant of G is a sum of monomial invariants, to obtain a complete
description of all invariants of G we only need to find monomial invariants. A
monomial f = xd11 x
d2
2 . . . x
dn
n is an invariant of G if
∏t
i=1 r
yid1
i1 r
yid2
i2 . . . r
yidn
in = 1 for
all integers y1, . . . , yt. This implies r
d1
i1 r
d2
i2 . . . r
dn
in = 1 for each i = 1, . . . , t.
For fixed i, the condition rd1i1 r
d2
i2 . . . r
dn
in = 1 gives u
∑n
j=1 djlij1
1 . . . u
∑n
j=1 dj lijr
r = 1
and that is equivalent to the system of congruences
d1li1k + d2li2k + . . .+ dnlink ≡ 0 (mod ok)
for each k = 1, . . . , r.
Since i runs from 1 to t, the condition that f is an invariant of G is equivalent to t
such systems. In total we obtain a system of rt congruences in variables d1, . . . , dn.
If we assume that numbers lijk are determined, then the last system can be solved
using integer programming since it is equivalent to the system of rt equations
d1li1k + d2li2k + . . .+ dnlink + okdik = 0
for each i = 1, . . . , t and k = 1, . . . r in integer variables d1, . . . , dn and rt variables
dik.
When we worked over the finite field F = GF (q) we were able to determine the
corresponding coefficients lij using discrete logarithms. In the case of finite rings
R we do not have such a tool at our disposal. If we want to determine coefficients
lijk, first we need to determine the structrure of the ring R and its group of units.
Papers [25] and [4] provide algorithms that perform this task with the complexity
O(|R| 12 ).
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Even when the basis u1, . . . , ur of U is known it is not clear how to determine
the coefficients lijk. This issue can make the use of the cryptosystems over finite
rings more appealing.
Important note is that all the difficulties we have just described are needed for
breaking of the cryptosystem. However for the design of the cryptosystem we do
need to know neither a basis u1, . . . , ur of U nor the exponents lijk. All that is
required is to check that the diagonal entries are units in the residue ring R. Since
our ring R is the residue class of Z modulo m, this condition can be verified by
computing the norm of these entries. If all the norm of the entry is coprime to m,
then its image in R belongs to U .
6.2.3. Conclusion. The breaking of the modified cryptosystem designed over R
seems to require techniques going beyond discrete logarithm problem. More work
that is required to specify the parameters of the cryptosystem that provide its
sought-after security is beyond the scope of this paper. We hope that we have
convinced the reader that this is a worthwhile endeavour to undertake.
In the papers [10] and [11] the cryptosystem based on invariants of groups over
a field F were considered. The above modification of our cryptosystem works over
finite rings instead of fileds. The reason why we need the ring structure is because
we want to use the matrix multiplication and conjugation by a matrix P to hide
the group G as suggested by Grigoriev. If it is determined that the conjuagation
by P does not increase the security of the cryptosystem, then we can consider a
more general setup and instead of working over finite rings we could work over finite
multiplicative groups. That is another direction for future investigation.
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